Starbucks Corporation, JD-66-24, 03-CA-324830 (ALJ Decision)
The decision involves allegations against Starbucks Corporation under Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. Key issues include the documented coaching of employees Lisa Carey and Jasmine Leli, related to union activities and alleged unilateral changes to workplace policies.
Summary of Legal Analysis:
Section 8(a)(1) Violation:
The ALJ found that Starbucks violated Section 8(a)(1) by issuing a documented coaching to Lisa Carey for wearing a union t-shirt. The Board applied Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, establishing that the right to wear union insignia is protected under Section 7. The ALJ noted that Starbucks failed to justify any "special circumstances" that could have outweighed Carey’s Section 7 rights.
Section 8(a)(3) Violation:
Starbucks was found to have violated Section 8(a)(3) by issuing the coaching to Carey due to her union activities. Under the Wright Line standard, Starbucks was found to have acted with anti-union animus in disciplining Carey specifically because of her union t-shirt, and Starbucks failed to prove it would have taken the same action regardless of her union activities.
Section 8(a)(5) Allegations:
The ALJ dismissed the Section 8(a)(5) charges regarding the failure to notify and bargain with the union before disciplining Carey and Leli. The ALJ relied on Care One at New Milford, which holds that an employer does not need to notify or bargain with the union before issuing discretionary discipline during the period between certification and the first collective bargaining agreement.
Jasmine Leli’s Case:
The ALJ found no violation in Leli’s case. The General Counsel could not establish that Starbucks unilaterally changed its time and attendance policy, as there was no evidence of a "grace period" policy being in place or eliminated. Leli was disciplined for lateness, including being over an hour late, which was not protected under any supposed grace period.
Affirmative Defenses:
Starbucks raised constitutional affirmative defenses, including the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, referencing SEC v. Jarkesy. However, the ALJ dismissed these defenses, relying on Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., which established that administrative adjudication of statutory rights does not violate the Seventh Amendment.
Significant Cases Cited:
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945): Established that employees have the right to wear union insignia at work, barring special circumstances.
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980): Created the test for determining whether an employer's adverse action was motivated by anti-union animus.
Care One at New Milford, 369 NLRB No. 109 (2020): Held that an employer does not need to notify or bargain with a union before issuing discretionary discipline post-certification but pre-contract.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA: Confirmed that administrative adjudication involving public rights does not violate the Seventh Amendment.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937): Addressed the scope of administrative proceedings under the National Labor Relations Act and held that they do not require a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. (Wellpath), 32-RC-349541 (Regional Election Decision)
The case involves a representation election petition filed by the National Union of Healthcare Workers (NUHW) to include Dentists and RN Supervisors in an existing bargaining unit at the Santa Rita Jail (SRJ), under California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. (Wellpath). The issue revolved around whether the RN Supervisors are statutory supervisors under Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
Summary of Legal Analysis:
Statutory Supervisory Status under Section 2(11):
The central issue was whether RN Supervisors are statutory supervisors as defined by Section 2(11) of the Act, which would exclude them from the bargaining unit.
The Board applied the three-part test from NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care. The employer must prove that RN Supervisors hold authority over any of the 12 listed supervisory functions (e.g., hire, transfer, discipline) and exercise independent judgment in doing so.
Authority to Assign and Direct:
The RN Supervisors populated a weekly assignment sheet, delegating duties to nursing staff, but their discretion was constrained by pre-established criteria, such as unit training and a rotational system. The ALJ found that this task did not require independent judgment as the RN Supervisors merely performed a routine clerical function.
The Board cited Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006), where the delegation of tasks based on predetermined criteria (e.g., skill or rotation) was insufficient to show independent judgment.
Supervisory Authority in Hiring and Firing:
The ALJ found no substantial involvement of RN Supervisors in the hiring process. Although they checked off training competencies for new hires, this did not confer independent authority to hire or effectively recommend hiring or firing. This routine certification of skills was found to lack the required discretionary judgment.
Conclusion on Supervisory Status:
The ALJ concluded that the RN Supervisors were not statutory supervisors under the Act, as their role did not meet the threshold of independent judgment in carrying out supervisory functions. Therefore, they are eligible to vote in the self-determination election to join the existing bargaining unit.
Significant Cases Cited:
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001): Established the test for determining supervisory status, requiring that an individual holds and exercises authority over one of the 12 supervisory functions with independent judgment.
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006): This seminal case outlines the Board's analysis for assessing supervisory status, specifically defining key terms like "assign," "responsibly to direct," and "independent judgment."
Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 NLRB 727 (2006): Affirmed that assigning tasks to balance workloads is routine and does not confer supervisory status without discretion.