Starbucks Corporation, 375 NLRB No. 49, 18-CA-298181 (Published Board Decision)
The Board found that Starbucks violated the NLRA during a union organizing campaign at its West Allis, Wisconsin store, but reversed several violations an administrative law judge had found.
A district manager and a store manager made unlawful statements to employees during one-on-one conversations and group "captive audience" meetings held in June and July of 2022. The Board agreed with the judge that the managers unlawfully solicited employee grievances by inviting complaints and offering to fix them during mandatory meetings, which amounted to an implied promise to remedy those grievances if workers rejected the union. The Board also agreed that managers unlawfully threatened the loss of benefits, including a previously announced medical travel benefit and a dress code change, by telling employees these improvements could not take effect because of the union petition. A separate violation was upheld for a store manager's statement to an employee that a planned pay raise would be lost.
However, the Board reversed findings that the store manager's statements that she would personally leave the company if the store unionized amounted to threats of more onerous working conditions. The Board held these comments were lawful expressions of personal opinion under Section 8(c) of the NLRA, since the manager merely described her own future plans based on past experience with a union, without threatening any employer-imposed reprisal. The Board distinguished the ALJ's cited precedent, Gunderson Rail Services, LLC and Beverly Enterprises, finding neither involved a comparable backdrop of mass layoffs or pervasive unlawful conduct. The Board also reversed the finding that the manager's isolated remark calling an employee "aggressive" was unlawful, concluding it was a passing reflection of her subjective perception rather than a coercive statement.
Member Prouty dissented in part, arguing the majority ignored the totality of circumstances, including the timing of the statements relative to union activity, the one-on-one settings, and the managers' seniority, which he argued would lead a reasonable employee to view the "leaving the store" and "aggressive" comments as coercive threats tied to other unlawful statements made in the same conversations.
The Board also declined to apply new standards from recent decisions addressing captive-audience meetings and statements about the employer-employee relationship, since those rulings were issued after briefing closed and were given only prospective effect.
Significant Cases Cited
Children's Center for Behavioral Development, 347 NLRB 35 (2006): An employer may criticize or disparage a union without violating the NLRA as long as its opinion does not threaten employees or interfere with their rights.
Gunderson Rail Services, LLC, 364 NLRB 279 (2016): A supervisor's statement that organizing activity "made things worse," made in the context of explaining a mass layoff, violated the NLRA.
Beverly Enterprises, 310 NLRB 222 (1993): A vice president's statement that things would get worse if employees voted for the union was an unlawful coercive threat.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969): Statements must be judged from the perspective of an economically dependent employee, considering the tendency to interpret implied threats, and predictions of unionization's effects must be based on objective fact.
Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377 (1985): An employer may lawfully tell employees that their direct relationship with management will change if they unionize, without this being an unlawful threat.
Starbucks Corporation, 375 NLRB No. 48, 19-CA-293492 (Published Board Decision)
The Board found that Starbucks unlawfully forced out a Seattle shift supervisor who was active in her store's union organizing drive, affirming most of an administrative law judge's findings but narrowing the basis for liability.
Myra Maza had worked at the Eastlake Avenue store since 2015 and had previously been permitted to limit her availability to one day a week while she held a second job. After Maza and a coworker told the store manager in March 2022 that employees intended to seek a union election, the Respondent reversed course: it told Maza she had to be available more than one day a week, and when she said she could not meet that requirement because of her other job, it stopped scheduling her entirely. She went unscheduled for three months before resigning in July 2022.
The Board agreed with the judge that this amounted to an unlawful constructive discharge under Section 8(a)(3) and (1). It rejected the company's claim that it was simply enforcing a neutral availability policy, noting that the store's business needs had stayed essentially the same since 2020, when Maza's reduced schedule had been allowed. Applying the Wright Line burden-shifting framework, the Board concluded the stated business justification was pretextual and that the real reason for cutting Maza's hours was her union activity.
The Board did part ways with the judge on one point: it reversed the finding that the company's threats to impose stricter availability rules and discharge Maza over them were an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1), concluding instead that those threats were simply the mechanism of the constructive discharge rather than a separate unlawful act. Member Prouty dissented on this point, arguing the threats were independently coercive under Starbucks Corp. and Polynesian Hospitality Tours regardless of the later discharge.
The Board also upheld the dismissal of claims involving a second employee, Lindsey Price, finding the company proved it would have fired her regardless of union activity because she seriously violated safety protocols by entering the store alone after finding signs of a break-in rather than calling police.
As a remedy, the Board ordered Maza's reinstatement with backpay and compensation for other financial harms tied to her job search and tax consequences from a lump-sum award, consistent with its approach in Thryv, Inc.
Significant Cases Cited
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980): Establishes the burden-shifting framework for determining whether an employer's adverse action against an employee was motivated by protected union activity.
Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022): Expanded the standard make-whole remedy to include compensation for other direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms beyond lost wages, such as job search expenses.
Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 NLRB 1068 (1976): Sets out the two-part test for finding a constructive discharge, requiring proof that burdens imposed on an employee were intended to force resignation and were motivated by protected activity.
Polynesian Hospitality Tours, 297 NLRB 228 (1989): Held that an employer's threats of termination can be an independent violation of the Act even when a subsequent discriminatory discharge also occurs.
Starbucks Corp., 373 NLRB No. 53 (2024): Found that an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening stricter enforcement of work rules and termination because of employees' union activities.
Everon, LLC, 357 NLRB No. 52, 01-RD-379428 (Published Board Decision)
The Board denied requests for review filed by both the employer and the union seeking to challenge a regional director's decision to block a decertification election. The Acting Regional Director had placed the petition in abeyance while the Board investigated several pending unfair labor practice charges, including allegations of bad-faith bargaining during the certification year. The majority found no substantial issues warranting review, concluding that the regional director had acted consistently with the Board's blocking-charge policy and that at least some of the charges alleged conduct inherently inconsistent with the petition itself.
Member Mayer wrote separately to raise concerns about the adequacy of the blocking letter. He noted that the letter failed to specify which allegations formed the basis for blocking the election, whether the charges were the kind that could interfere with a fair election or were instead inconsistent with the petition, or why charges from 2024 regarding alleged refusal to hire union "salts" would affect an election that already occurred in December 2024. He argued that the Board should require regional directors to identify the specific allegations relied upon in blocking determinations and to classify them accordingly, though he concurred in denying review for institutional reasons while leaving the door open to revisit the issue later.
Significant Cases Cited
Mark Burnett Productions, 349 NLRB 706 (2007): Established that the Board reviews a regional director's decision to block an election under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Lone Spur Cafe Queen Creek LLC, 375 NLRB No. 51, 28-CA-284166 (Published Board Decision)
The Board granted the General Counsel's motion for default judgment against a Queen Creek, Arizona restaurant operator after the company failed to comply with an informal settlement agreement it had reached to resolve unfair labor practice charges.
The charges stemmed from two separate incidents. In September 2021, employees Michael Houtz, Karen Houtz, and Jennifer Standage raised concerns about unsafe working conditions and staged a work stoppage. Managers responded by threatening employees with discharge over the protest, and the company fired all three. The company had also issued an overly broad directive requiring employees to discuss issues with management only in a "professional manner," adopted in response to the employees' protected activity. Separately, in June 2022, employee Jon Kyle Taulton and coworkers raised concerns about problems with their pay, including issues with direct deposit. A manager responded by threatening employees with discharge and reprisals, characterizing their complaints as insubordination, and the company then fired Taulton.
The company and the charging parties settled the case in January 2024, with the company agreeing to post notices, pay backpay and other compensation to the affected employees, and take other remedial steps. When the company failed to follow through, the Regional Director gave notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure, as the settlement agreement required. After further unsuccessful attempts to secure compliance, including the company's claim that it had ceased operations, the Regional Director reissued the complaint and the General Counsel sought default judgment.
Because the company did not respond to the Board's notice to show cause, the Board treated all allegations in the complaint as admitted, consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement and the Board's precedent in U-Bee, Ltd. The Board found that the company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA through its threats, discharges, and overbroad rule, and ordered it to comply with the unmet terms of the settlement: mailing notices to employees, paying backpay and related compensation with interest, providing neutral references, and removing references to Taulton's discharge from its files. The General Counsel did not request a "full remedy" despite being entitled to seek one under the settlement's default provision, and the Board, citing Benchmark Mechanical, Inc. and Opal Care, LLC, declined to order one on its own.
Significant Cases Cited
U-Bee, Ltd., 315 NLRB 667 (1994): Establishes that when a respondent defaults on a settlement agreement's noncompliance terms, the allegations of the resulting complaint are deemed admitted as true.
Benchmark Mechanical, Inc., 348 NLRB 576 (2006): Supports the principle that the Board will not grant a remedy broader than what the General Counsel actually requested.
Opal Care, LLC and Ruby Care LLC d/b/a Emerald Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, 368 NLRB No. 103 (2019): Reinforces that the Board will not sua sponte expand a remedy beyond what was sought by the General Counsel.
Richard Grubb and Associates, 22-RC-391825 (Regional Election Decision)
The regional director directed an election among archeological field technicians and crew chiefs at a cultural resources management firm, rejecting the employer's arguments that both groups should be excluded from the proposed bargaining unit.
The employer had argued that crew chiefs were statutory supervisors under Section 2(11) of the NLRA because they assigned work, directed field technicians, could discipline or discharge them, effectively recommended hiring and rehiring decisions, and adjusted grievances. The director found the employer's evidence too vague and unsupported by specific examples to meet its burden on any of these grounds. Crew chief assignments were deemed routine, limited to telling technicians where to dig based on a predetermined project plan, which did not require independent judgment. The chiefs' direction of field work was similarly governed by detailed project plans, an employee manual, and government regulations, leaving little room for discretion. Claims about disciplinary authority, including vague references to "immediate dismissal" or "corrections," lacked documentation or concrete examples. Testimony that crew chiefs' input was nearly decisive in rehire decisions was undercut by the absence of detailed evidence about specific cases. The director concluded the crew chiefs functioned as working foremen rather than supervisors, citing Greenhorne & O'Mara, a similar case involving archeological crews, and other precedent such as Oakwood Healthcare and Golden Crest Healthcare Center.
On the second issue, the employer contended field technicians were casual, on-call workers lacking a community of interest with the regular workforce and therefore ineligible to vote. The director applied the Board's traditional Davison-Paxon formula, under which intermittent employees are eligible if they averaged four or more hours of work per week over the preceding quarter, finding it appropriate given evidence of recurring project-based employment, a continuing pool of technicians drawn on repeatedly, and substantial hours logged by many workers over multiple years. The director found technicians and crew chiefs shared similar pay, training, and working conditions, and noted instances of overlap between the classifications. Disputes over whether any specific laid-off technician retained a reasonable expectation of recall were left to be resolved through the Board's challenge procedure at the election itself.
The director ordered a mail-ballot election, given the geographically dispersed nature of the workforce across several states, with ballots to be mailed in October 2026 and counted in November.
Significant Cases Cited
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006): Established the Board's framework and definitions for determining supervisory status under Section 2(11), including the meanings of "assign" and "independent judgment."
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001): Held that the party asserting supervisory status bears the burden of proof and that independent judgment can be diminished by detailed employer rules.
Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc., 326 NLRB 514 (1998): Found that archeological crew chiefs performing similar duties were not statutory supervisors and could be grouped with field technicians in a bargaining unit.
Davison-Paxon Co., 185 NLRB 21 (1970): Established the standard formula for determining voting eligibility of intermittent or on-call employees based on average weekly hours worked.
Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 NLRB 727 (2006): Held that secondary indicia of supervisory status cannot establish such status absent proof of a primary indicium, and that routine authority like verifying timecards does not establish supervisory authority.