Aleut Information Technology, LLC, JD-54-26, 19-CA-350069 (ALJ Decision)
An administrative law judge found that Aleut Information Technology, LLC committed multiple violations of the NLRA in connection with its dealings with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 959, which represented operators at a Department of Defense facility in Anderson, Alaska, but concluded that the company lawfully fired one employee despite his union activity.
The case grew out of two separate storylines. The first involved a bargaining-unit employee, Egbert Visker, who wanted the company to move operators from a 7-days-on/7-days-off schedule to a 14/14 schedule. When he learned the union had already agreed to keep the 7/7 schedule in ongoing contract talks, Visker began pursuing decertification of the union instead, discussing the idea repeatedly with supervisor Bryce Wolffe. In January 2025, Wolffe told Visker that employees could get the 14/14 schedule if Visker collected enough signatures on a decertification petition. Visker did so, submitting a petition with six signatures on January 28, 2025, and the company withdrew recognition from the union on February 10, 2025, later implementing the 14/14 schedule.
The judge found that Wolffe's statement went well beyond permissible ministerial assistance to an employee-led decertification effort and amounted to an unlawful promise of a benefit in exchange for signatures, violating Section 8(a)(1). The same conduct also constituted unlawful direct dealing with a bargaining-unit employee, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1).
On the withdrawal of recognition itself, the judge found it unlawful on multiple independent grounds. First, the company failed to authenticate the signatures on the decertification petition and did not establish the size of the bargaining unit, so it never met its burden under Levitz Furniture of showing an actual loss of majority support. Second, under Hearst Corp., the petition was tainted because the company's own unfair labor practices were directly related to the decertification drive. Third, applying the Poole Foundry settlement-bar framework, the judge found the company had not bargained for a reasonable period of time following an earlier informal settlement agreement before withdrawing recognition, given that real bargaining did not begin until November 2024 and only seven relatively short sessions had occurred before the February 2025 withdrawal. The judge rejected a separate theory under Master Slack Corp. that would have linked the decertification effort to the company's earlier unilateral changes, finding no causal connection between those unrelated violations and the petition.
The judge also found two unrelated unilateral-change violations: the company unlawfully began strictly enforcing a 36-hour cap on flextime accrual in June 2024 without bargaining, and unlawfully granted discretionary wage increases to three employees in October 2024 without notifying or bargaining with the union, rejecting the company's reliance on NLRB v. Katz because the raises involved significant discretion rather than an automatic, pre-committed formula.
On the second storyline, the judge found that operator Eric Vantrease's discharge for failing to obtain a DOD-required security certification was lawful. Although Vantrease served on the union's bargaining committee, the judge found the General Counsel failed to show the company harbored animus toward that activity, since supervisor Wolffe's inquiries and the company's eventual deadline were tied to the certification's expiring waiver period rather than Vantrease's union role. The judge also found that even if animus had been shown, the company proved it would have discharged Vantrease regardless, given that he made minimal effort to complete the required training despite ample off-duty time.
As a remedy, the judge ordered an affirmative bargaining order with a temporary decertification bar, along with make-whole relief for the unlawful unilateral changes and periodic bargaining progress reports to the NLRB's Region 19.
Significant Cases Cited
Levitz Furniture, 333 NLRB 717 (2001): An employer may withdraw recognition from an incumbent union only upon objective evidence, such as an authenticated petition, that the union has actually lost majority support, and bears the burden of proof.
Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB 764 (1986): A decertification petition is tainted, and cannot support withdrawal of recognition, when the employer committed unfair labor practices directly related to the decertification effort.
Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78 (1984): Sets out a four-factor test for determining whether a causal connection exists between an employer's unrelated unfair labor practices and a subsequent decertification effort.
Poole Foundry & Machine Co., 95 NLRB 34 (1951): An employer that settles a bargaining violation must bargain for a reasonable period of time before a union's majority status can be challenged, based on factors including bargaining complexity and progress made.
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980): Establishes the burden-shifting framework for evaluating whether an employee's discharge was motivated by protected union activity under Section 8(a)(3).
Together for Youth, 03-RC-391296 (Regional Election Decision)
A regional director for the National Labor Relations Board has dismissed a union's petition to represent Administrators on Duty and Supervising Detention Counselors at a secure juvenile detention facility in Albany, New York, finding that both job classifications qualify as supervisors and are therefore excluded from coverage under the NLRA.
Together for Youth runs a 39-bed facility housing juvenile offenders. The International Union, Security, Police and Fire Professionals of America petitioned to represent the facility's 12 Administrators on Duty and eight Supervising Detention Counselors, who sit above roughly 105 Secure Detention Counselors in the facility's chain of command. The employer argued that both groups already function as supervisors under Section 2(11) of the NLRA and should not be allowed to unionize. The parties agreed both groups qualify as guards under Section 9(b)(3), leaving supervisory status as the only disputed issue.
The regional director found the employer met its burden on both job titles, though for different reasons. Administrators on Duty conduct the sole interview for entry-level detention counselor applicants, and their hiring recommendations are followed without further review except for a background check. The record also showed that Administrators on Duty had, on at least two occasions, independently resolved union grievances on the employer's behalf without input from higher management. Either the hiring authority or the grievance-adjustment authority alone was enough to establish supervisory status.
Supervising Detention Counselors presented a closer question. The director found insufficient evidence that they responsibly direct staff, noting testimony about their duty to "address" counselors who leave their posts was too vague to show real accountability for subordinates' performance. However, the director found that Supervisors use independent judgment when assigning counselors to specific posts, teams, and duties each shift, weighing factors like safety plans, staffing ratios, one-to-one observation requirements, and conflicts between staff and residents. Because those assignment decisions are not dictated by a rigid schedule or higher authority, the director concluded they satisfy the "assign" function under Section 2(11), making Supervisors statutory supervisors as well.
With both groups found to be supervisors, the director ruled that no question concerning representation exists and ordered the petition dismissed.
Significant Cases Cited
NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001): Established that the party asserting supervisory status bears the burden of proof and set out the framework for analyzing the twelve enumerated supervisory functions under Section 2(11).
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006): Defined key Section 2(11) terms including "assign," "responsibly to direct," and "independent judgment," and held that charge nurses who exercised independent judgment in assigning nurses to patients were supervisors even without evidence of responsible direction.
Croft Metals, Inc., 348 NLRB 717 (2006): Held that supervisory status must be established by a preponderance of the evidence and reinforced the standards for applying the Section 2(11) test.
Shaw Inc., 350 NLRB 354 (2007): Reaffirmed that the burden of proving supervisory status rests on the party asserting it exists.
Community Education Centers, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 17 (2014): Held that purely conclusory evidence, without specific supporting detail, is insufficient to establish supervisory status.
Starbucks Corporation, 28-CA-313460 (Unpublished Board Decision)
The Board denied Starbucks' appeal of an Administrative Law Judge's ruling in a case involving Workers United, the union affiliated with the Service Employees International Union.
The dispute centered on a motion by the NLRB's General Counsel to withdraw certain consolidated complaint allegations and remand the matter to the Regional Director. Administrative Law Judge Mara-Louise Anzalone denied that motion, and Starbucks sought special permission to appeal her decision to the Board.
A three-member panel, Chairman James R. Murphy and Members David M. Prouty and Scott A. Mayer, granted Starbucks permission to file the appeal but rejected it on the merits. The Board found that Starbucks had not shown the judge abused her discretion in refusing to let the General Counsel withdraw the allegations and send the case back to the Regional Director. As a result, the judge's order stands and the withdrawn allegations remain part of the consolidated complaint before her.