05/21/2026: Member Mayer Disapproves of Enforcement of "Like or Related" Cease-and-Desist Language
RD directs craft unit election.
Pacific Bell Telephone Company, 374 NLRB No. 111, 20-CA-301120 (Published Board Decision)
The Board issued a default judgment against Pacific Bell Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T California, finding that the company breached a 2022 informal settlement agreement by later committing the same type of violation it had promised to avoid — unreasonably delaying the provision of information to its union, Communications Workers of America, Local 9421.
The case has a layered history. In late 2022, the company settled unfair labor practice charges (Pacific Bell I) alleging it delayed furnishing the union with requested information in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA. The settlement included a standard “like or related” cease-and-desist provision and a default judgment clause. The Regional Director closed the case in February 2023 after the company completed all affirmative obligations — posting notices and conducting mandatory training.
But new charges followed. A subsequent complaint (Pacific Bell II) alleged that the company again unreasonably delayed responding to a December 2022 union information request. An ALJ found a violation, and the Board affirmed in March 2025. The General Counsel then moved for default judgment in the original settled case, arguing that the post-settlement violation breached the “like or related” cease-and-desist term.
The Board agreed, relying on Aqua-Aston Hospitality and Jack Cooper Holdings, which hold that a “like or related” violation in a subsequent case constitutes a breach of the settlement’s ongoing cease-and-desist obligations. The Board also rejected the company’s argument that the General Counsel’s motion was time-barred under Section 10(b), holding that provision governs when charges must be filed — not when a default judgment motion may be brought. Because the company had already complied with the affirmative relief in the settled case, the Board issued only a cease-and-desist order.
Member Mayer concurred reluctantly, issuing a pointed opinion calling for reconsideration of the Board’s precedent at the “earliest opportunity.” He argued that the existing framework allows the General Counsel to resurrect closed, remedied cases without giving the charged party a meaningful chance to cure the alleged breach — a process he views as inconsistent with due process principles and the NLRA’s policy favoring voluntary settlement. He noted that the standard settlement form does not clearly spell out that signing it means agreeing never again to commit a similar violation, and that any ambiguity in a contract should be construed against its drafter — here, the General Counsel. He also emphasized that settlements resolve more than 90 percent of meritorious cases and serve as the “lifeblood” of the administrative process, warning that the current approach risks discouraging respondents from settling at all.
Significant Cases Cited
Aqua-Aston Hospitality, LLC, 365 NLRB 604 (2017): Default judgment granted where respondent’s post-settlement conduct violated the cease-and-desist terms of a prior settlement agreement.
Jack Cooper Holdings Corp. d/b/a Jack Cooper Transportation Co., 365 NLRB 1793 (2017): Respondent’s refusal to provide requested information after settlement breached the prior agreement’s “like or related” prohibition, supporting default judgment.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 361 NLRB 944 (2014): Post-settlement conduct “like or related” to the originally prohibited conduct supports a finding of default judgment.
Independent Stave Co., 287 NLRB 740 (1987): Articulated the NLRA’s policy favoring peaceful, nonlitigious resolution of disputes through settlement.
NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112 (1987): Supreme Court described settlement agreements as the “lifeblood” of the NLRB’s administrative process.
Kodiak Roofing & Waterproofing, LLC, 32-RC-383994 (Regional Election Decision)
Region 32 Regional Director Christy J. Kwon directed an election in a unit of sheet metal workers at a commercial and residential roofing contractor in Sparks, Nevada, rejecting the employer’s argument that the only appropriate unit must encompass all 72 of its roofers.
Sheet Metal Workers Local Union 26 petitioned to represent roughly 15 Assistant Roofers and Journeymen performing primarily sheet metal work — installing metal roofing, metal siding, metal flashing, and ACM panels. The employer countered that those employees shared an overwhelming community of interest with all other roofers at its Sparks facility, making a smaller unit inappropriate.
The Regional Director found the petitioned-for unit appropriate on two independent grounds. First, applying the standard from American Steel Construction, the unit was readily identifiable and shared an internal community of interest: the sheet metal workers used specialized tools, performed distinct tasks, worked in separate crews, and were largely supervised apart from other roofers. Payroll records from three prevailing wage projects showed that employees almost exclusively coded hours under either the Sheet Metal or Roofer classification — not both — reinforcing that the two groups function separately in practice.
Second, the Regional Director found the unit qualified as a craft unit under Burns & Roe and Nissan North America, which ended the inquiry without need to evaluate the employer’s competing unit. The sheet metal workers were primarily engaged in tasks not performed by other employees, requiring substantial craft skills and specialized tools. Although Kodiak lacked a formal apprenticeship program — a factor that cut against the craft unit finding — the Regional Director concluded that the determinative consideration, following Schaus Roofing, was that skilled sheet metal work is assigned along craft lines with no evidence that non-sheet metal roofers perform skilled sheet metal tasks.
The Regional Director also ruled out including Service Technicians, who work in a separate department doing maintenance and repair rather than new construction, and have minimal interchange with sheet metal workers.
On the election method, the director ordered a mail ballot, finding that employees report directly to job sites scattered across northern Nevada — some up to 200 miles from the Sparks facility — satisfying the “scattered” standard under San Diego Gas & Electric.
Significant Cases Cited
Burns & Roe, Inc., 313 NLRB 1307 (1994): Sets out the multi-factor test for determining whether a petitioned-for unit constitutes a craft unit.
Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011): Establishes that excluded employees must share an “overwhelming” community of interest — with community-of-interest factors overlapping almost completely — to require their inclusion in a petitioned-for unit.
American Steel Construction, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 23 (2022): Articulates the three-part test for unit appropriateness and places the burden of demonstrating an overwhelming community of interest on the party asserting it.
Nissan North America, 372 NLRB No. 48 (2023): Holds that a finding of craft unit status ends the unit-appropriateness inquiry, with no further analysis of whether excluded employees share an overwhelming community of interest.
Schaus Roofing, 323 NLRB 781 (1997): Applies the craft unit analysis to sheet metal workers in a roofing context, holding that assignment of skilled work along craft lines is the determinative factor even where other factors favor a broader unit.