04/06/2026: Sixth Circuit Applies Garmon Preemption to Dismiss ERISA Suit
Some good analysis on the independent federal remedy exception.
Rieth-Riley Construction Co. V. Operating Engineers Local 324, 25-1823 (Sixth Circuit)
Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 324 is a Sixth Circuit decision about whether a federal court could hear an ERISA claim that was, at its core, a dispute about obligations under the NLRA.
Rieth-Riley, a Michigan road construction company, had contributed to Local 324’s health, pension, and other benefit funds under a collective bargaining agreement that expired in 2018. The parties never reached a new contract. Under Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA, an employer must maintain the status quo of an expired CBA — including benefit fund contributions — while bargaining for a successor agreement. Rieth-Riley believed this obligation was mutual, meaning the funds were equally required to keep accepting its contributions. For years the funds agreed. Then in late 2024, the trustees reversed course and demanded Rieth-Riley sign a new compliance agreement before they would continue accepting contributions. Rieth-Riley refused, the funds stopped accepting payments, and Rieth-Riley sued in federal district court under ERISA, arguing the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties by refusing contributions they were obligated to accept.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the Garmon doctrine barred federal court jurisdiction over the claims.
The Garmon Doctrine
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (1959), the Supreme Court established that when conduct is even arguably protected or prohibited by Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA, courts must defer to the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction rather than adjudicate the dispute themselves. The rationale is twofold: preserving uniformity in national labor policy and making use of the Board’s specialized expertise. Critically, the doctrine focuses on the conduct being challenged, not the legal label a plaintiff puts on its claim. A party cannot escape Garmon simply by framing an NLRA dispute as an ERISA violation.
Rieth-Riley advanced two arguments for why Garmon should not apply. First, it argued the doctrine only applies to state-law claims — after all, Garmon was originally developed to prevent states from interfering in federal labor relations. The Sixth Circuit rejected this, noting that the Supreme Court applied Garmon to ERISA claims in Advanced Lightweight Concrete under nearly identical circumstances. Second, Rieth-Riley argued that because the NLRB has no jurisdiction to hear ERISA claims, Garmon deference makes no practical sense here. The court disagreed: the relevant question is not whether the NLRB can grant the specific relief requested, but whether the underlying conduct — the funds’ refusal to accept contributions — is arguably regulated by Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA. It is, and that is enough to trigger Garmon.
The Independent Federal Remedy Exception
Garmon has a recognized exception for cases where the labor law question arises only as a collateral issue in a suit brought under an independent federal remedy. In those situations, the labor law question is just background context, and the federal court can resolve the case without wading into the NLRB’s domain. Rieth-Riley argued its ERISA fiduciary duty claims fit that description — the NLRA status quo obligation was merely a background fact, not the heart of the case.
The court rejected this framing by looking at what the complaints actually said. Both Rieth-Riley and the employee plaintiffs had explicitly alleged that the funds themselves had a statutory obligation under the NLRA to accept contributions. That made resolution of the NLRA question a necessary element of the ERISA claims, not a collateral one. As the court put it, the claims could succeed “only if” the funds’ conduct violated the NLRA — which placed the dispute squarely within the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction and outside the independent federal remedy exception.
Because the ERISA claims were preempted, the preliminary injunction failed for lack of any likelihood of success on the merits, and the proposed amended complaint — which relied on the same NLRA-dependent theory — was futile for the same reason.
The Concurrence
Judge Hermandorfer concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to flag what he described as serious tensions in Garmon doctrine. His primary concern is structural: federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to hear cases within their jurisdiction, and Garmon strips that jurisdiction based not on clear statutory text but on the NLRA’s policy penumbras. He also raised the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo — which requires courts to exercise independent judgment on statutory interpretation rather than deferring to agencies — and SEC v. Jarkesy — which limits agencies’ ability to adjudicate claims that resemble traditional legal causes of action. Both decisions, he suggested, may put pressure on Garmon‘s going-forward viability. He was careful to say the doctrine remains binding, but signaled that courts should resist expanding it mechanically beyond its established scope.
Significant Cases Cited
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959): Established that when conduct is arguably subject to Section 7 or 8 of the NLRA, courts must defer to the NLRB’s exclusive competence.
Laborers Health & Wellness Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539 (1988): Applied Garmon preemption to ERISA claims where the underlying conduct was arguably an unfair labor practice.
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004): Articulated the “independent federal remedy” exception and held that Garmon bars federal claims that can succeed only upon proof of an NLRA violation.
Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 174, 598 U.S. 771 (2023): Clarified that the “arguably subject” standard asks whether the NLRA arguably protects or prohibits the conduct at issue, not whether a remedy exists before the Board.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Held that courts must exercise independent judgment on statutory interpretation, which the concurrence invokes to question whether Garmon‘s deference to the NLRB on statutory questions remains valid.